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•    For the first time since 1970, Illinois did not have
divided government in the first session follow-
ing a census and reapportionment, and thus
Democrats were free to draw any maps they
liked. 
•    After Illinois lost a House seat due to reappor-
tionment, the Democrat-drawn map ensured
that Republican incumbents faced fewer famil-
iar voters than Democrats. The new district map
produced fewer competitive seats, most of
which lean to the Democrats, providing Demo-
cratic U.S. House candidates in Illinois a clear
advantage.
•     Nineteen states, including Illinois, gave com-
plete control to one party or the other in 2011
U.S. House redistricting. Republicans controlled
redistricting in 14 states having 164 seats, while
Democrats did so in only five states, having a
mere 42 seats.
•     When one party drew the new U.S. House map
in a state after the 2010 census, that party did
comparatively well in 2012. Parties that gained
control of redistricting in 2011, not having had
it in 2001, seem to have engineered larger
swings in their own favor.
Delving into the complicated and often politically fraught process of redrawing electoral district
boundaries after each decennial census, this chapter examines whether there is evidence that
the purportedly gerrymandered maps played a role in the 2012 election. Using the 2012 U.S.
House election, the authors reveal why partisan control of the process should be regarded with
suspicion.
The 2012 election brought mostly bad news to Re-publicans, who failed to unseat President Obama
despite a poor economy and lost 11 of the 14 U.S.
Senate races regarded as “in play.” Their one bright
spot was comfortable retention of control of the U.S.
House, where they lost only eight seats. The presi-
dent’s home state was a conspicuous exception to
this point that the U.S. House was the best venue for
Republicans in 2012: in Illinois, Republicans fell from
holding 11 of 19 congressional seats to having only
six of 18. More than half of their net losses nation-
wide can be assigned to the Land of Lincoln. Expla-
nations for how Republicans weathered the storm in
the U.S. House and why Illinois was unusually
stormy for them both involve district lines. One can-
not forecast U.S. House results, or understand the
election outcomes after the fact, without paying at-
tention to where and how the districts were drawn.
Most important, in the end, is who drew them. 
In 2011, the Institute of Government and Public
Affairs published Rethinking Redistricting: A Dis-
cussion About the Future of Legislative Redistricting
in Illinois. The project described in that report began
immediately following the 2010 census, and pre-
ceding the design of new electoral maps for the Illi-
nois House and Senate and for the U.S. House
seats in the state. 
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One component of the study was a pub-
lic-opinion survey of registered voters in
Illinois, aimed at assessing what they re-
gard as fair redistricting. Unsurprisingly,
we found that most did not know how
U.S. House and General Assembly dis-
tricts are drawn. Despite that ignorance,
however, they had no difficulty identi-
fying fairness criteria, for both process
and outcomes. For instance, nearly 50
percent said they preferred that maps be
drawn by an independent, nonpartisan
commission whose members do not di-
rectly participate in politics; less than 3
percent said that redistricting should be
done by the legislature and governor. With respect to
outcomes, the respondents preferred that districts
take relatively simple shapes and that they follow pre-
existing county and city boundaries wherever possi-
ble. About 60 percent ranked one of these two goals
as the highest priority. The third most popular out-
come criterion was that “as many districts as possible
should be about equally balanced between Demo-
cratic and Republican voters.”
Following Pat Quinn’s narrow defeat of Bill Brady in
the 2010 gubernatorial election, however, Democrats
controlled both chambers of the General Assembly
and the governor’s office. For the first time since the
1970 Constitution took effect, Illinois did not have a
divided government in the first session following a
census and reapportionment, and thus Democrats
were free to draw the maps as they liked. Not sur-
prisingly, they did not opt to relinquish control by
reforming the system, notwithstanding public pref-
erences for nonpartisan mapmaking. All of the
maps they drew—for U.S. House districts and for the
state Senate and House districts, the latter having to
be nested in the former—are widely regarded as
partisan gerrymanders. In other words, observers
believe the maps were designed to maximize
Democratic and minimize Republican
seat totals. Certainly, it would be diffi-
cult, if not impossible, to argue that the
Democrats in control of Illinois state
government prioritized any of the cri-
teria cited above as most popular with
voters. 
So what? There is nothing illegal about
triumphant parties using their power
to try to lock in their advantages for the
future. To the victor go the spoils.
Equally, however, there is nothing to
celebrate in politicians designing elec-
toral institutions to be deliberately
unresponsive to public sentiment. Here after, we
try to determine if there is, indeed, clear evidence
that the supposedly gerrymandered maps played a
role in the outcomes of the 2012 election. We begin
by focusing in some detail on Illinois and then widen
our domain by considering other states, many of
which saw Republicans designing their U.S. House
maps unilaterally. To simplify our task, we set aside
state legislative electoral maps, which deserve their
own analysis. Our larger purpose is to reiterate the
sentiment of Illinois registered voters that redistrict-
ing done by one party alone is typically detrimental
to the standard of “free and fair” elections, often held
to be the quiddity of democracy.
A Very Brief Primer on Gerrymandering 
Gerrymandering means drawing electoral districts
with some express political purpose, and it is thus a
highly elastic term. It takes many forms, but it usu-
ally refers to three particular politically meaningful
criteria: race, incumbency status, and partisan
balance. 
First, districts can be drawn based on the racial and
ethnic composition of the electorate, to concentrate
or disperse particular groups. A very rough sum-
mary of the complicated and shifting jurisprudence
on racial gerrymandering in the U.S. is that, as the
2012-20 maps were being drawn, it was widely un-
derstood that the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (renewed
and amended in 1970, 1975, 1982, and 2006) requires
states with sufficiently large black and/or Hispanic
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populations to draw as many majority-minority dis-
tricts as possible.1 Hence, all discussion of other
forms of gerrymandering hereafter is to be under-
stood as manipulation of district boundaries under
the initial constraint that, in
many states, several districts
must be constructed to have
populations that are mostly
minority. Following the 2010
census in Illinois, the presump-
tion was that no U.S. House
map would pass judicial
scrutiny unless at least three of
the 18 districts were majority-
black and at least one was ma-
jority-Hispanic. The latter, in
particular, cannot be created without violating any
standard of compactness (simplicity of shapes), but
courts treat this and other such desiderata as second-
ary, and thus dispensable.
Second, incumbent politicians obviously have strong
interests in how their districts are altered, and ger-
rymandering has often been done with the goal of
protecting as many incumbents as pos-
sible. This outcome often prevails when
the two parties jointly draw a map,
thus eliminating the potential for a par-
tisan arrangement. For example, the
often bizarrely shaped congressional
districts drawn in Illinois in 2001 were
largely seen as an incumbent-protec-
tion gerrymander. But there is no com-
pelling public policy reason to draw
maps that are clearly intended to help
or harm incumbents’ efforts to be re-
elected. Generally, incumbents do ex-
tremely well getting re-elected in American
legislative elections, and political scientists agree
that there is a substantial incumbency advantage, a
vote bonus accrued by virtue of holding office. The
precise size of the bonus varies by time and place,
but most estimates are in the broad range of 3-10 per-
cent. In other words, any given legislative candidate
can be expected to win several extra percentage
points of vote share when running as an incumbent,
all else equal. Although there is ongoing debate
about what factors explain this bonus, familiarity is
clearly one component. In turn, incumbents highly
value electorates who already know them, with
whom they have cultivated a “personal vote.” For
that reason, continuity with old districts is a key trait
that assists incumbents, to the detriment of potential
challengers.
The third common type of gerrymandering, and
perhaps the one most frequently suggested by the
term, is the partisan gerrymander. Candidates pre-
fer familiar electorates, but it is even more impor-
tant for them to be able to run in districts that are
friendly in terms of partisan balance. Voting by in-
dividuals and vote totals for whole constituencies
are never entirely predictable, but there are strong
regularities that can be detected in a series of elec-
tions. Hence, every district has a “nor-
mal vote” that describes its degree of
partisan lean.
However, the incentives for the party
as a whole differ. Parties (or party
leaders) prefer not to “waste” votes in
overly safe districts. The most efficient
translation of votes into seats for a
given party requires fairly competitive
seats that lean only a little in the direc-
tion of that party. In turn, if Democrats
(Republicans) craft a map to favor
their party, collectively, and harm Republicans (De-
mocrats), collectively, they will draw a small num-
ber of extremely safe Republican (Democratic)
districts and a larger number of less safe districts
that lean in their direction. The result is a partisan
gerrymander in which Democrats (Republicans)
win a higher number of seats than their total vote
in the state would seem to warrant because they
win many seats by relatively close margins, while
the Republicans (Democrats) who win do so by
landslides, essentially wasting votes.
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1 Interested readers might compare Thornburg v. Gingles, 478
U.S. 30 (1986), Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993), Johnson v.
DeGrandy, 512 U.S. 997 (1994), and Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S.
952 (1996) to try to piece together the status quo on when,
why, and how majority-minority districts are permitted
and/or mandated.
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U.S. House Elections in Illinois in 2012: Breaking Up
the Personal Vote Is Not Hard to Do
The first sign that the U.S. House districts for the
2012-20 elections in Illinois were designed to make
life difficult for Republican incumbents is which dis-
tricts were most radically altered. Based on the 2000
census, Illinois was apportioned 19 seats for 2002-10,
but the state grew slowly enough, vis-à-vis other
states, that the apportionment based on
the 2010 census allocated the state only
18 seats. That fact, coupled with fairly
large discrepancies in population
across the 19 old districts as of 2010, en-
sured that lines would have to move a
good deal. Population shifts differed
across seats, and all of the eight seats
held by Democrats after the 2010 elec-
tion were undersized, relative to the
new quota (the 2010 Illinois population
divided by 18), by an average of 88,461.
By contrast, the 11 Republican-held districts con-
sisted of six that were undersized, by an average of
52,883, and five that were oversized, by an average
of 53,413. That contrast suggests that one might have
expected the Democratic incumbents to see their
constituencies changed more than the Republicans,
on average, in a nonpartisan process. After all, sim-
ply by trimming, one could have constructed five
new districts with 100 percent familiar constituents
for the Republican incumbent in the oversized 8th,
11th, 13th, 14th, and 16th districts.  
What the Democratic mapmakers concocted, by
contrast, was a map depriving Republican incum-
bents of familiar constituents at a much greater rate
than Democrats. With Jerry Costello having retired,
the eight Democratic U.S. Representatives who
sought re-election ended up competing in districts
having, on average, 74 percent constituents from
their old districts. (They all ended up in districts
with the same number as their prior districts as
well.) Costello announced his plans to retire after
the new map had been signed into law, so one
might prefer to include him in the calculation. With
94 percent of the residents in the new 12th having
lived in the old 12th, including him increases the
Democratic average to 76 percent. The 11 Republi-
can incumbents, meanwhile, found themselves
competing in districts that had, on average, only 42
percent familiar constituents. That figure includes
Tim Johnson, who won the primary for the new 13th
(only 27 percent of which was part of the old 15th,
represented by Johnson), but withdrew before the
general election. The new 16th district saw a primary
face-off between Republican incumbents Don
Manzullo and Adam Kinzinger. Forty-five percent
of the district consisted of territory
from the old 16th (Manzullo) and 32
percent was drawn from the old 11th
(Kinzinger). Neither of them could
have avoided an intra-party battle
without running in a seat having less
than 10 percent overlap with his old
district. The highest continuity value
for any Republican was 64 percent, the
proportion of the new 18th district that
was also part of the old 18th (both won
by Aaron Schock). The lowest value for
any Democrat was also 64 percent, for the 4th district
(the majority-Hispanic seat held by Luis Gutierrez
that is utterly safe in the general election for
whichever Democrat wins the primary election). No
one familiar with the large literature on the personal
vote would doubt that the strong bias toward main-
taining familiar constituencies for Democrats and
not Republicans would be advantageous for the for-
mer and disadvantageous for the latter, all else
equal. 
Choosing Normal Votes  
As important as familiarity is in determining a per-
son’s vote for his/her lawmaker, political party
matters much more. Thus, the most important fea-
ture of a map of legislative districts is the distribu-
tion of partisanship. For each district, one can
estimate the expected outcome in a “normal” elec-
tion, that is, an open-seat race where there is no
Number of U.S. House Seats that Illinois was
apportioned following the 2010 census,
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incumbency advantage at play, in a year without a
strong partisan tide favoring either side, when
roughly equal candidates compete, spending about
equal amounts. With sufficient data, one can use sta-
tistical models to decompose election results into
components, including an estimate of the normal
vote plus estimates of incumbency advantage, high-
quality challenger (or open-seat candidate) effects,
spending benefits, and inter-election tides. Unfor-
tunately, one cannot produce such estimates with
results from only one election, and so we cannot yet
use that method to compare the 2002-10 and 2012-
20 maps in terms of normal vote.
Instead, we can consider two simpler estimates of
each district’s normal vote: the average of Barack
Obama’s 2008 and John Kerry’s 2004 vote shares and
the Cook Partisan Voting Index, which is based on
those same data, but adjusted to the national out-
come.2 The key feature for both measures is that we
use the same data to gauge the districts from the old
and new maps, and so focus strictly on how the
clumps of partisan voters were re-grouped to alter
the partisan composition of the districts.
Whichever measure we use, we reach the same basic
conclusion. The top panels of Figure 1 (page 75)
show that whereas the old map featured eight dis-
tricts in the partisan-competitive range, where the
mean Democratic presidential vote share was be-
tween 45 percent and 55 percent, the new map has
only four such districts. Over the 2002-10 period,
those eight districts were won by Democrats 37 per-
cent of the time (15/41) and by Republicans 63 per-
cent of the time (26/41), about what one would
expect from the 5:3 split on either side of the 0.5 line.
But note that both parties won races from each bin.
The Democratic wins included Debbie Halvorson’s
2008 win in the 11th, where the average Democratic
presidential vote was 49.5 percent. In 2010, Republi-
can Bobby Schilling won the 17th, where the average
of Kerry and Obama’s 2008 shares was 54 percent.
Only one race using the new map produced a sur-
prise in terms of this measure of normal vote: Re-
publican Rodney Davis won the new 13th district,
where the Kerry-Obama average is 52.5 percent.
Eleven of the new districts, however, appear to be
out-of-reach for Republican candidates, based on re-
cent precedent for how safe a seat has to be in nor-
mal partisan vote before one party has no hope of
winning, barring extreme scandal.3
The bottom panels, based on the Cook Partisan Vot-
ing Index, reveal essentially the same basic shift. By
this measure, Illinois had 11 competitive seats be-
tween 2002 and 2010, nine of which were slightly
friendlier to Republicans, plus seven seats safe for
Democrats. Now, with a reduction of one seat, there
are 10 potentially competitive seats, seven of which
lean to the Democrats, plus another two safe Repub-
lican seats and six safe Democratic seats. The new
“normal” outcomes thus favor Democratic candi-
dates much more than those under the old lines.
Paint it Blue
The evidence thus far suggests that the new Illinois
U.S. House map was skillfully designed to reduce
the number of Republican members in the delega-
tion. The prior map, in place from 2002 to 2010, was
a bipartisan, incumbency-protection gerrymander,
C H A P T E R  7
2 Cook’s index is computed by the political analyst Charlie Cook. Values for 2010 and the 2004 and 2008 presidential votes shares at the
congressional district level for the old maps are reported in The Almanac of American Politics 2012 (Michael Barone and Chuck McCutcheon).
These same data for the new map are reported at ballotpedia.org. 
3 A good example of scandal tipping a district in an otherwise unthinkable direction was the Louisiana 2nd district in 2008. The district was
about 60 percent black and gave Barack Obama 75 percent of its vote (matching John Kerry’s share). But Republican Joseph Cao, a Viet-
namese American, narrowly edged nine-term Democratic incumbent William Jefferson, who had been indicted for accepting bribes in
2007 and would subsequently be convicted and sentenced to 13 years in jail. By contrast, in the 2012 race in the Illinois 2nd, incumbent
Jesse Jackson easily won re-election despite having declined to campaign and taken a leave from House duties. His absence was initially
unexplained, and then attributed to medical treatment for bipolar disorder. Shortly after the election, however, he resigned his seat, ac-
knowledging that he is under investigation. Rumors of impending federal indictment for campaign-finance violations continue to swirl
at time of writing.
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having been developed by one Republican and one
Democratic U.S. Representative, Dennis Hastert and
William Lipinski. One prime goal was to avoid de-
priving Chicago of a seat. Moreover, “Hastert had
been generous in using his powers as Speaker to aid
(Chicago Mayor Richard M.) Daley, Lipinski and
other Chicago Democrats on Chicago issues and
projects (so)…(m)aintaining a Republican majority
that would keep Hastert in the speakership was in
the interest of Chicago Democrats,” according to The
Almanac of American Politics 2012.4 Democrats in the
state legislature deferred to their federal colleagues,
evidently placing more priority on the maps for the
General Assembly. 
So while neither the old nor the new U.S. House
maps can be said to have been created blind to po-
litical interests, the purposes were distinct. What
happens when a bipartisan,
pro-incumbent map is re-
placed by one intended to help
Democrats and harm Republi-
cans? If the mapmakers know
their business, seats change
hands. Illinois Democrats won
12 of 18 seats (67 percent) in
2012, a gain of more than 14
percentage points over their
average during the five elec-
tions held on the old map (10
of 19, or 53 percent). This cal-
culation can be regarded as
only a preliminary estimate of
the effect of redistricting, insofar as there are four
more election cycles to come before the current map
Figure 1
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of American Politics 2012. Chicago, IL: National Journal, p.
512.
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will be replaced. The best result for De-
mocrats in the last decade came in 2008,
when they won 12 of 19 seats (63 per-
cent), so if 2012 ultimately turns out to
be the Democrats’ best year under the
new map, later analysts might ulti-
mately conclude that the 2002-10 and
2012-20 district lines were not actually
much different in partisan lean. That
prospect, however, seems quite un-
likely. It also seems improbable that the
fairly simple analysis above is mistak-
enly attributing to the map effects that
are actually due to presidential coattails, differentials
in retirement, personal scandals, or some other fac-
tors. We readily acknowledge that we have not at-
tempted a comprehensive statistical decomposition
of all forces involved in the recent U.S. House races
in Illinois, but the patterns are so dramatic that we
have little doubt that they are genuine.
Redistricting U.S. House Seats Nationwide
Of course, Illinois is not the only state whose 2012
election results were shaped by new maps. In re-
sponse to the 2010 census, every state was required
to redraw its state legislative maps; the 43 states with
more than one congressional district had to redraw
them, as well. Adopting a nationwide view offers
additional insight into the impact of re-
districting on legislative elections be-
cause at least two of its dimensions
vary among the states: the institution
controlling redistricting and, if a parti-
san process, the party controlling it. In
some states, control of the process even
differed between U.S. House and state
legislative districts. A nationwide view
also gives some insight into a puzzle of
the 2012 election results. How could
Democrats win the White House and
augment their majority in the U.S. Sen-
ate while failing to make larger gains against the Re-
publican majority in the U.S. House (where they
gained only eight seats, falling far short of taking
control)? Redistricting is certainly not the only ex-
planation for this divergence, but it is clearly part of
the story. 
Apportionment
Even before the first legislative districts were drawn
in 2011, the 2010 census had helped the Republican
cause. The first step in the congressional redistricting
process is reapportionment, that is, the reallocation
of U.S. House seats among states in response to pop-
ulation shifts. Following a decades-long trend, the
2011 apportionment saw the upper Midwest and
Northeast lose congressional representation to the
South and Southwest. The two exceptions to this pat-
tern were Louisiana’s loss of a seat due to the exodus
caused by Hurricanes Katrina and Rita and the state
of Washington’s gain of a seat as its population con-
tinued to boom, swollen in part by an exodus from
California, which failed to gain any U.S. House seats
for the first time since it joined the union in 1850.
Figure 2 shows the 18 states that gained or lost
House seats in 2011, with the change in congres-
sional delegation size indicated for each of them.
Most of these states gained or lost a single seat, but
Ohio and New York each lost two seats, while
Florida gained two seats and the Texas delegation
increased by four. This map also denotes which of
these states Obama (blue) and Romney (red) won in
2012. Although Obama won more electoral votes
than Romney (332 to 206), the 26 states (and the





majority in the U.S.




in the U.S. House?”
Figure 2
2010 Apportionment and the 2012 Presidential Election

















Institute of Government & Public Affairs   •   igpa.uillinois.edu 77
District of Columbia) that he won had lost six elec-
tors to Romney’s 24 states after the 2010 census. To
forecast House elections, one needs to know what
regions of each state were growing comparatively
quickly (or slowly), but with red states having out-
paced blue states in growth, a good first guess is that
Republicans should have been poised to gain.
Who Controlled Redistricting in 2011?
Next, consider redistricting itself. Although Illi-
noisans understand this process to be highly parti-
san, with both parties fighting for raw political
advantage, it is not done this way in every state. Of
course, politicians throughout the country have a
great personal and partisan stake in the drawing of
legislative maps, but many states have institutions
or particular situations that took the partisan edge
off the process in 2011. Some states establish nonpar-
tisan or bipartisan commissions to draw their leg-
islative maps, presumably reducing the motivation
and opportunity to conduct a partisan gerryman-
der—although an incumbent protection gerryman-
der is a strong possibility in such a situation.5
Likewise, when the two parties have split control
over the redistricting process, they can be expected
to abandon a partisan-motivated gerrymander for
an incumbent-protection-motivated gerrymander.
In other states, the statutory redistricting process
broke down in some way, resulting in no maps that
the court system accepted as fair. In those states, the
courts themselves drew the maps used in 2012, al-
though in several of these states, the expectation is
that the regular process will be tried again before
2014. Each of these—nonpartisan or bipartisan
commission, or court-imposed districting, which
we classify as “nonpartisan” for simplicity here-
after—provides little opportunity for partisan ad-
vantage in the process, although we might expect
to find incumbents of both parties to be advantaged
by them.
On the other hand, 19 states including Illinois gave
complete control to one party or the other in 2011 U.S.
House redistricting. As can be seen in Table 1, the
partisan advantage was not equally distributed: Re-
publicans controlled redistricting in 14 states having
164 seats, while Democrats did so in only five states
having a mere 42 seats. Why this great imbalance?
The 2010 off-year election occurred during a weak
economy, so we would expect the party of the pres-
ident to fare poorly in legislative races that year.6
And it did.7 The GOP gained 63 seats in the U.S.
House—the biggest single-election seat gain by ei-
ther party since 1948—winning a substantial 49-seat
majority. Such success in congressional elections in
2010 could have bidden ill for the GOP in 2012.
When parties enjoy large surges, they tend to win
many marginal seats, leading them to have vulner-
able freshmen in the following presidential election.
Furthermore, because these freshmen would have to
run in new districts in 2012, before they had a chance
to establish themselves with their constituents, they
would likely be especially vulnerable. We have al-
ready noted that only two of the five GOP freshmen
congressmen from Illinois survived the election of
2012, one by knocking off another Republican in-
cumbent in the primary.
Of course, state gubernatorial and legislative elec-
tions have an even greater impact on redistricting,
since state officials craft all legislative maps in most
States including Illinois gave complete
control to one party or the other in 2011 U.S.
House redistricting.
Republicans controlled redistricting 
in 14 states (164 seats), while Democrats
did so in only 5 states (42 seats).
5 Michael P. McDonald. 2004. “A Comparative Analysis of Re-
districting Institutions in the United States, 2001-02.” State
Politics and Policy Quarterly 4(4):371-95.
6 Gary Jacobson, The Politics of Congressional Elections, 8th Edi-
tion. Boston, MA: Pearson. Chapter 6.
7 James E. Campbell. 2010. “The Midterm Landslide of 2010:
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states. And the 2010 elections at the state level were
every bit as successful for the GOP as were the con-
gressional elections. Of the 6,125 state legislative
seats on the ballot that year, Republicans had a net
gain of 680 additional seats, leaving them with more
seats nationwide than at any time since the 1920s.8
Even more significantly, 20 state legislative cham-
bers flipped from a Democrat to a Republican ma-
jority in 2010. Republicans did equally well in the 37
gubernatorial races in 2010, with a net gain of six for
a total of 29 governorships. The 2010 GOP sweep
thus helps explain the imbalance in party control
over redistricting the following year. Thus, in addi-
tion to the leg up they got through reapportionment,
the Republicans had this clear advantage going into
the map-drawing process. 
The Impact of Redistricting on the 2012 Legislative
Elections
Table 1 shows who drew the new maps in place in
2012 and also who drew the maps in effect for the
prior decade (see table notes for details on the anom-
alous cases of states that had multiple U.S. House
maps in use over the 2002-10 period). Even though
Republicans had to protect more incumbents in mar-
ginal districts as a result of the 2010 elections, their
control of the redistricting process seems to have
shielded them from normal surge-and-decline
losses. In particular, the bottom rows of the table
show the average proportions of U.S. House seats
held by Democrats in the states according to who
drew the 2012 maps. 
Starting on the left of the table, Republican-con-
trolled states saw almost three-fourths of their U.S.
House seats won by Republicans, whereas Demo-
cratic-controlled states saw about 60 percent of their
seats won by the Democratic candidates. Those
numbers alone are suggestive, but somewhat diffi-
cult to interpret, given that control of state govern-
ment is never randomly assigned by a political
scientist undertaking an experiment. Naturally,
states in which one party is strong in state legislative
races will often exhibit the same partisan lean in sub-
sequent U.S. House races. To try to adjust for state-
to-state variation in partisan lean, we divided the
proportion of 2012 U.S. House races won by the De-
mocrats by 2012 Obama vote share. These values are
shown in the bottom row, and a score near 1 indi-
cates that the U.S. House shares were about on par
with the presidential vote performance. The states
with Republican-drawn maps saw a large discrep-
ancy—the Democratic House candidates badly
under-performed compared to their presidential
candidate. In the five states with Democratic maps,
by contrast, the Democratic presidential-vote and
House-seat shares are about the same. 
The remaining columns, however, complicate that
simple contrast. Maps drawn by Republicans and
Democrats together were markedly better for Dem-
ocratic House candidates than those created by os-
tensibly nonpartisan actors. However, both sets of
states produced scores fairly close to 1 in their aver-
age ratio of Democratic success in House races to
Obama share, so this gap could be a fluke of which
states fell into each category rather than an indication
of systematically more pro-Democratic maps result-
ing from bipartisan rather than nonpartisan process.
However, the seven states that did not feature any re-
districting, because they have only one seat, resemble
the states controlled by Republicans in terms of both
of the measures we computed, casting some doubt
on the straight-forward interpretation that the latter
demonstrate partisan gerry mandering. 
In short, while there is some sign that the large GOP
edge in mapmaking power translated into a seat ad-
vantage, simple across-state averages are very crude
measures. It is difficult to adjust for a state’s partisan
lean when ceiling effects apply (e.g. Massachusetts
elected 10 Democrats and no Republicans in 2010
and nine Democrats and no Republicans in 2012).
Moreover, the effect of map-drawing power is likely
to be smaller in states with relatively few seats (say,
two to five).
To complement the examination of Illinois above,
therefore, we selected a few cases of fairly large
states where Republicans drew the 2012 map, not
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having had control of the lines for the prior
decade. Do we find evidence of the new maps
having assisted the GOP, mirroring the case of
Illinois described earlier? First, consider North
Carolina. The 2002-10 elections, fought on a map
designed by Democrats, produced six Democrats
and seven Republicans three times (in 2002, 2004,
and 2006), eight Democrats and five Republicans
once (in 2008), and seven Democrats and six Re-
publicans once (in 2010). On average, the map
produced a 51 percent Democratic seat share. In
2012, the new Republican-drawn map resulted in
nine Republicans and four Democrats. That 31
percent Democratic share represents a 20 percent-
age point decline. 
Ohio went from a bipartisan map in the 2002-10 pe-
riod to a Republican gerrymander in 2012. Al-
though the state tends to be exceptionally closely
fought in presidential races, it has fairly consis-
tently leaned toward the Republicans in U.S. House
races. Even so, Republicans were able to squeeze
more advantage out of the state with their new
lines. The 2002-10 races produced six Democrats
and 12 Republicans in 2002 and 2004, seven De-
mocrats and 11 Republicans in 2006, 10 Democrats
and eight Republicans in 2008, and five Democrats
and 13 Republicans in 2010. In 2012, the new map
elected four Democrats and 12 Republicans, so the
Democratic seat share dropped 13 percentage points,
from 38 percent to 25 percent.
Table 1
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United States
House Map
Average % U.S. House Seats to
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Source: Classifications based on Justin Levitt, “All about Redistricting,” Loyola University (Los Angeles) Law School (http://redistricting.lls.edu/), accessed November 15, 2012,
and Almanac of American Politics 2012.
Note: The category “Bipartisan” includes cases of divided government as well as commissions or other bodies that included equal numbers of partisan officials. The “non-
partisan” category includes all cases of maps drawn by courts, regardless of whether the judges were associated with parties.
* In Texas, the 2002 map was drawn by 2 Democratic judges and 1 Republican judge, but the 2004-2010 map was drawn by Republicans only. In Georgia, the 2002 map was
drawn by Democrats, the 2004 map was drawn by a court, and the 2006-10 map was drawn by Republicans.  
2012-2020 United States House Map
Conclusion
Precise estimates of the impact of par-
ticular gerrymanders are beyond the
scope of this chapter. We purposely ig-
nored state legislative maps here only
to keep our task simple. Careful analysis
of those maps should be informative.
We have refrained from estimating com-
plicated vote-seat functions mainly because even
simple comparisons can suffice to establish the basic
point that electoral maps matter. Where one party
drew the new U.S. House map following the 2010
census, that party did comparatively well in 2012.
Parties that gained control of redistricting in 2011, not
having had it in 2001, seem to have engineered large
swings in their own favor, as Illinois, North Carolina,
and Ohio demonstrate. Control over redistricting is
not always a guarantee of electoral success. Sometimes
parties forgo the opportunity to try to maximize seat
totals. Moreover, finely drawn partisan gerrymanders
can backfire when there is a large swing against the
mapmaking party, because such a map features fairly
small advantages for the favored party, by definition.
It is certainly possible to target only select incumbents
when altering lines to break up personal votes. 
Despite all of these potential complications, the
analysis above sheds some light on how the GOP
could lose the presidency and suffer losses in almost
all of the “toss-up” Senate races in 2012 while simul-
taneously limiting U.S. House losses, and thus retaining
control of the House. Leaders of both parties fully
understood the importance of the 2010 state legislative
and gubernatorial races for redistricting. Republicans
made an extraordinary national effort to win as many
of these races as possible, and probably profited from
the “good fortune” of having lost the 2008 presidential
race.9 Having now withstood a fairly poor year in
2012, the party could be poised for more gains in
2014, when Democrats can expect the usual “midterm
loss.” Long-term forecasts are always risky, but current
members will now have two years to
settle into their new districts to improve
their popularity and boost name recog-
nition, so barring major national trends,
the GOP majority control of the U.S.
House could be safe at least until the
next redistricting election in 2022.
One could argue that the 2012 election
results illustrate the upside of partisan control of re-
districting. The Founders created a separation-of-
powers system in part to prevent large waves of en-
thusiasm from being too quickly translated into
policy. They feared excessive volatility and valued
deliberation. The House Republican majority in
Congress will presumably require a Democratic
president and a Democratic Senate to negotiate and
compromise on policy. We take this argument seri-
ously, and our purpose in this chapter is not to de-
nounce Democratic control of the Illinois U.S. House
delegation or Republican control of the U.S. House.
But as we emphasized at the outset, it is, in the end,
difficult to defend electoral maps that are expressly
designed to exaggerate partisan advantages and in-
sulate elected officials from public sentiment. Any
electoral system involving single-member districts
will have some redistricting effects. But these can be
small when the lines are not driven almost exclusively
by partisan considerations. In turn, partisan control
of the process of drawing districts should be regarded
with suspicion by anyone who is genuinely disin-
terested in regard to the fates of the parties, but
keen on competitive races and responsive elections.
Smart politicians armed with the power to fix election
results will find the temptation very hard to resist.
The survey results with which we began this chapter
show that ordinary citizens, while not particularly
informed about the redistricting process, neverthe-
less believe that redistricting matters and should be
done in a nonpartisan manner, with compactness
and competitiveness as prevailing criteria. By the
standards of the general public, partisan gerryman-
dering is undesirable and unfair. The current Illinois
map is shrewd, and it demonstrates the skill of its
Democratic designers, but that is not what the people
of the state deserve. The process for redrawing elec-
toral boundaries in Illinois should be revised.  
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“Smart politicians
armed with the power
to fix election results
will find the
temptation very hard
to resist.”
